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Abstract 
This article takes a critical approach to emotion regulation suggesting that the 
concept needs supplementing with a relational position on the generation and 
restraint of emotion. I chart the relational approach to emotion, challenging the 
‘two-step’ model of emotion regulation. From this, a more interdisciplinary 
approach to emotion is developed using concepts from social science to show the 
limits of instrumental, individualistic and cognitivist orientations in the 
psychology of emotion regulation, centred on appraisal theory. Using a social 
interactionist approach I develop an ontological position in which social 
relations form the fundamental contexts in which emotions are generated, toned, 
and restrained, so that regulation is decentred and seen as just one moment or 
aspect in the relational patterning of emotion. 
 
Keywords: emotion regulation, relational emotion, social interaction, 
distributed emotion regulation. 
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One of the issues with the literature on emotion regulation is the centrality of 
regulation itself. Why are we so focused on the regulation of emotion? The 
everyday definition of regulation refers to the control of something by means of 
rules and regulations, the latter set by an authority. In Gross’s influential account 
of emotion regulation, this ‘refers to the processes by which individuals influence 
which emotions they have, when they have them, and how they experience and 
express these emotions’  (Gross, 1998, p. 275), a definition he still adheres to 
(Gross, 2014, p. 6). But this creates two issues, the first of which emotion 
regulation theorists rarely refer to explicitly; that is, it implies that emotion is 
something that needs regulating, invoking the old Enlightenment idea that 
emotion is unruly and potentially dangerous unless it is kept in check by reason. 
Although many emotion regulation theorists have come to challenge the split 
between reason and emotion, especially under the influence of neuroscience, 
which is increasingly calling into question the old idea that there are separate 
centres in the brain for reason and emotion, this has not led to questions being 
asked about why regulation is so important in the study of emotion. The 
implication is that emotions are potentially disruptive and in need of regulation 
for the sake of health and wellbeing. 
This leads to the second issue with the idea of emotion regulation: that is, it 
creates what Campos, Frankel, and Camras (2004) have referred to as a ‘two-
factor’ or ‘two-step’ model of emotion regulation, in which the first step involves 
‘a set of processes related to the generation of emotion, and the second a 
different set of processes coming after the elicited emotion and involving 
management or mismanagement of the generated emotion’ (p. 377). This is 
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critiqued because it posits the existence of emotion in some unregulated state 
followed by attempts to regulate or manage emotion, at which point the nature 
of the emotion and its expression changes. It has been argued that we must 
abandon the two-step model in order to understand that emotions only ever 
appear in some regulated form and that, therefore, there is only one process in 
acting out emotions and not two (Campos, Frankel, and Camras, 2004; Campos, 
Walle, Dahl, and Main, 2011; Kappas, 2011). But this raises the question of 
exactly what it is in emotion regulation that needs regulating? 
In this article I take up current challenges to the idea of emotion regulation that 
suggest a relational approach to the issue. In the first section below I set out 
Gross’s influential account of emotion regulation, which draws on central 
concepts from psychology, particularly appraisal theory. In the second section I 
look at the challenges to this and the development of a relational approach to 
emotion regulation within psychology itself. In the third section I attempt to 
develop the relational approach by drawing on ideas from within sociology and 
social psychology to create a more interdisciplinary approach. In the relational 
approach, emotions are not primarily seen as individual phenomena; instead, 
emotions are understood as patterns of relationship (Bateson, 1973), in that 
emotional expressions only occur in particular relational patterns, or what 
Gergen (1994) calls ‘emotional scenarios.’ In an example given by him, the anger 
and hostility that emerge in scenarios of domestic violence are generated by 
repetitive patterns of relationship between couples that escalate into increasing 
levels of antagonism: these are not emotions that individuals want to feel, nor do 
they necessarily feel them prior to their relational engagements, but rather they 
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emerge from the pattern of relationship. Here, I take this approach in a slightly 
different direction through a social interactionist perspective on emotions. This 
involves adopting the ontological position that social relations form the 
fundamental contexts in which ambivalent or conflicted emotions are generated, 
toned, and restrained, so that regulation is just one moment or aspect of the 
relational patterning of emotion. This also provides another perspective to 
current theories of emotion regulation, which are formed around the centrality 
of individual cognitive processes of appraisal, suggesting a more embodied and 
interactive approach to emotion and cognition. 
 
J. J. Gross and the Psychological Generation and Regulation of Emotion 
Gross has emerged as one of the key theorists in the study of emotion regulation, 
developing models that incorporate different elements of psychology. For 
example, his modal model of emotion aims to identify features that are evident in 
many different psychological approaches to emotion, including the centrality of 
appraisal theory. In this model, 
Emotions involve person-situation transactions that compel attention, 
have meaning to an individual in light of currently active goals, and give 
rise to coordinated yet flexible multisystem responses that modify the 
ongoing person-situation transaction in crucial ways (Gross, 2014, p. 5). 
Thus, in the modal model, the sequence begins with a psychologically relevant 
situation that can be specified by features of the external or internal 
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environment, such as standing in front of an audience to give a talk or thinking 
about that situation prior to it happening. The situation is then attended to in 
ways that give rise to appraisals of what it means in respect of goals that are 
relevant to the individual, and the emotional response is generated by these 
appraisals. So prior to giving a talk the person’s goal may be to look smart and 
intelligent in front of the audience or to get their message across; however, if the 
situation is appraised as dangerous, in the sense of ‘I may mess up and look 
stupid and inarticulate’, the emotional response will be of fear or nerves; but if 
the situation is appraised in terms of opportunity, as in ‘what a great opportunity 
to get my ideas across’, the emotion will be of excitement or positive anticipation 
that minimizes or replaces nerves. The emotions generated by appraisals involve 
changes in experiential, behavioural, and neurobiological response systems that 
also feedback into the situation. Thus, if the person manages to stay calm at the 
start of their talk that will increase their sense of confidence and control, 
whereas if the person’s fear overwhelms them the appraisal that the situation is 
going badly may cause them to be even more afraid. Overall, though, the 
sequence of situation, attention, appraisal, and response (with the response 
feeding back into the situation and changing it in some way) is central to the 
modal model of emotion. 
However, depending on the goals of the individual, a person may attempt to 
regulate the processes of emotion generation, impacting on the dynamics of the 
emotion as it unfolds over time. In his process model of emotion regulation, Gross 
(2014) identifies five types or ‘families’ of emotion regulation. The first is 
‘situation selection’, which involves selecting or avoiding altogether particular 
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situations because of the emotions they generate. The second, ‘situation 
modification’, involves changing the situation in some way to change its 
emotional impact. Third, ‘attentional deployment’ involves no change in the 
actual situation but instead a change in the mental focus of the individual on 
aspects of the situation that create a desired emotional response, whilst also 
diverting attention from other aspects that might create unwanted or negative 
emotions. Forth, ‘cognitive change’ involves a person changing the way they 
think about a situation by giving it a different meaning. And finally ‘response 
modulation’ is where a person tries to modify, hide, or suppress the emotional 
response, or affect another response entirely. Of the different families of emotion 
regulation, Gross (2002) has highlighted cognitive change as among the most 
effective, especially strategies of cognitive reappraisal, because it can be applied 
early in the process of emotion generation. Reappraisal is a form of cognitive 
change in which new personal meaning is assigned to a situation that changes 
experiential, behavioural, and physiological response tendencies without the 
need for constant self-monitoring and regulation. Thus a potentially emotion-
eliciting situation is cognitively re-construed in less emotional terms or in terms 
of completely different emotions, as in my earlier example of someone preparing 
to give a talk: instead of someone thinking about what could go wrong and 
getting fearful, they can reappraise the situation as a great opportunity and their 
nerves as excitement. In this way certain negative emotions are ‘down-regulated’ 
(fear and nervousness) and more positive emotions are ‘up-regulated’ 
(excitement and positive anticipation). 
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Although Gross agrees with critics like Campos et al. (2004) and Kappas (2011) 
that it is hard to draw a clear distinction between the generation and regulation 
of emotion, nevertheless through the modal and process models he maintains a 
functional distinction between emotion and its regulation. In this functional 
distinction, emotion arises when a person cognitively evaluates a situation as 
relevant to a particular goal, whereas emotion regulation occurs when the 
emotional response itself is subject to an evaluation that leads to the activation 
of a goal to change it (Gross, 2014). So for example, if my goal is to get to work at 
a particular time so as not to be late for a meeting, I may find myself getting 
angry over a slow driver on the road blocking my progress. As I feel the anger 
rising or maybe getting out of hand I may negatively value that anger and try to 
change it. This would involve emotion regulation – perhaps by trying to 
cognitively re-evaluate the situation in seeing the slow driver as unsure of the 
road and deserving of patience rather than anger. In instances like this there is 
actually a kind of two-step process in play, where we evaluate our emotional 
responses and, if we do so negatively, may try to change them into something we 
feel is more acceptable. 
For me, though, the central problem with Gross’s approach to both emotion 
generation and emotion regulation is that the approach is primarily focused on 
the individual, cognitive relation to a situation, having at its core ‘a conception of 
emotion that prioritizes internal action tendencies’ (Gross, 1998, p. 278). This 
downplays the relational aspect of emotion in which people affect each other in 
their interactions. It is true that Gross (2014) does account for both intrinsic and 
extrinsic emotion regulation, the latter occurring when someone else acts to 
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regulate our emotions – for example, to calm us down or make us smile. 
However, he notes that in most psychological research, studies of extrinsic 
emotion regulation are done mainly with infants, whereas work on intrinsic 
regulation is done mainly with adults. Gross has attempted to account for the 
social and cultural factors involved in emotion regulation, yet the work he has 
done with colleagues on this topic is mainly focused on the culture-specific 
nature of regulation strategies and the social consequence of these, rather than 
on the cultural generation of emotion (Butler, Lee, & Gross, 2007). Ultimately, 
both the modal model of emotion and the process model of emotion regulation 
are based on a lone individual, presumably adult, cognitively appraising a 
situation in the light of their own goals. 
Furthermore, although Gross says that emotions are ‘whole body phenomena’, 
he nevertheless characterises the process approach to regulation as an 
‘information-processing model’ (Gross, 2014, p. 7). Certainly, for Gross, appraisal 
theory is central to both his modal and process models, a theory that from the 
beginning in Arnold’s work stressed the way that objects must be cognitively 
evaluated as ‘affecting me personally as an individual with my particular 
experience and my particular aims’ (cited in Colombetti, 2014, p. 85). Here, the 
meaning of emotional experience is given in terms of how objects affect me 
‘personally’ as ‘an individual’, with social meanings left unconsidered. After 
Arnold, appraisal theory became more disembodied and cognitively based, 
whereby ‘the smart, evaluative aspect of emotion is all in the head, and the rest 
of the organism has no evaluative function’ (Colombetti, 2014, p. 98). In the final 
section here, I shall suggest a more integrative, social and embodied approach to 
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emotion. Before that I turn to the relational approach to emotion regulation 
being developed by others. 
 
The Relational Approach to Emotion Regulation in Psychology 
For Campos et al. (2004) emotion is a relational phenomenon because it is the 
result of a person–event transaction. This includes the emotional 
communications that go on between people in interactions, involving the 
expressive reactions in the face, voice, and bodily gestures, as well as linguistic 
expressions, all of which convey the impressions that others have of us and that 
we have about them. The response to these impressions is emotional because it 
involves the feelings we have about others and the way that others’ impressions 
of us affects our self-feeling (Cooley, 1922/1983; Mead, 1934). The relational 
approach also ‘places the human being into ever larger but concentric circles of 
social influence, from the dyadic to the cultural and historical’ (Campos et al., 
2004, p. 379). Furthermore, emotion and emotion regulation are conjoined from 
the beginning as one process that reflects the attempt by the person to adapt to 
the problems encountered in transactions with the environment, or with others 
in the social context. 
 Although Campos et al. recognise something like the two-step process of 
‘emotion then emotion regulation’ in people’s experience this is often an illusion. 
Rather, what is happening in such experiences is a form of conflict resolution 
between two emotions in which each emotion aims at a different goal. An 
example they give is that a person may have a sexual desire for another but holds 
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this in check for fear of rejection. Thus the emotion and its checking or regulation 
emerges from the same situation but is constituted by two emotional impulses 
with a different goal: desire or love that wants to win the affection of another, 
countered by fear of rejection that aims to protect the self from possible hurt. For 
me, this is an important development in the understanding of emotion and its 
regulation, because it introduces the idea of emotional tension, conflict or 
ambivalence into a relational understanding of emotion. Indeed, it is rare that 
social situations, and the others we interact with in situations, affect us with 
simple or single emotions of which we are instantly aware. Our responses are 
often more subtle, mixed or ambiguous. One could also add the wider cultural 
dimension here and say that in certain relational contexts we are aware of 
having emotions we ought not to have: for example, in cultures where same-sex 
sexual relations are outlawed or denigrated, the desire or love for another 
person of the same sex may be checked by fear of social reprisals, or be 
suppressed or tainted by feelings of guilt and shame. In this process, one emotion 
does not emerge before the other, which then acts to regulate it; rather the two 
emotions are generated together from within the same situation and there is 
tension between them: they may also bleed together like watercolours on a 
palette creating emotions like shameful love or guilty desire. 
For Campos, Walle, Dahl, and Main (2011) emotional encounters involve not 
only a relation between the person experiencing the emotion and the object of 
that emotion, but also with other persons who have their own agendas, goals, 
and behaviours. Emotion regulation occurs not only when two emotions are in 
conflict but also when the goals and strivings of various interrelated individuals, 
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or groups, clash and the participants then have to negotiate and coordinate their 
goals, in the process regulating their emotions. Managing emotion then involves 
relinquishing, modifying, or persevering with one’s goals. Although the approach 
of Campos et al. is important because it recognises that both constitutive and 
regulatory processes are relational, occurring in significant transactions with the 
world and with others, at another level the theory of emotion remains solidly 
individualistic. That is because emotion generation and regulation is taking place 
in relations between people who all are striving for their own individual goals, as 
are the individuals in appraisal theory. 
Equally, Kappas (2011) has argued that emotion and emotion regulation should 
not be understood as two separate processes and that the auto-regulation of 
emotion is both an intrapersonal and inter-individual, or relational, 
phenomenon. For him, auto-regulation forms a part of the termination of 
emotion within the regulatory loops of a system, and this can happen either by 
intrapersonal processes or by inter-individual ones within a social context. An 
example of intrapersonal auto-regulation would be the experience of grief and 
how the emotion comes to exhaust itself over time as an individual comes to 
terms with loss. An added dimension, though, is the way that the social group 
intervenes to terminate and help resolve grief, and does so in different ways and 
according to different time-scales in various cultures. However, a problem here 
for Kappas is that although the social becomes an element in the feedback loops 
of the regulatory system, this is not the fundamental or necessary basis of 
regulation. In his approach, based in systems theory, the fundamental system of 
auto-regulation is an individual one, and the social system only feeds into this. In 
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contrast to this I will argue in the next section that social relations are the 
contexts in which emotions are generated, interpreted, and regulated. In this 
approach, emotion regulation is understood to be but one element in the 
relational process in which individuals affect, move, and restrain one another. 
 
The Relational Approach in Sociology and Social Psychology: A Social 
Interactionist and Embodied Account 
In the approach I will develop here, I want to build on the work of both Campos 
et al. (2004; 2011) and Kappas (2011) by using elements of their relational 
approach. In particular, I want to develop the idea of emotion being about the 
relation of the person to an event or situation, however for me individuals are 
not simply related to some external situation but are embedded in situations that 
involve relations to others as well as to circumstances and events. This means 
adopting the relational approach I spoke of earlier, in which emotions are not 
primarily individual phenomena but are patterns of relationship (Bateson, 1973; 
Gergen, 1994). Furthermore, how people feel about events will also depend on 
the cultural meanings that give sense and feeling to them, although these 
cultures can be localized and diverse. So, for example, at a funeral the emotions 
we feel (grief, sadness, respect, etc.) depend on exactly how we were related to 
the deceased, how close we were to them or to their family and friends. The 
emotions we feel during the funeral will also depend on the local culture and 
whether the meaning of the funeral is a sombre affair that calls for mourning and 
grief, or whether this is the celebration of a life; for instance, a wake that involves 
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a party, during which there also would be laughter and collective merriment. In 
such situations it is harder to identify the goals at which each individual is 
aiming, leading them to appraisals of the situation that determine what they feel: 
instead, individuals are bodily immersed in a situation that involves relational 
interconnections through which they are affected, moved, and restrained in 
various ways. This can also involve ambivalence, as in the case of the funeral of 
someone towards whom we had mixed feelings: here, we may stay silent about 
our more negative emotions out of respect to the deceased’s family and closer 
friends. 
Thus I also support the idea of Campos et al. (2004) that what feels like emotion 
regulation – the control of one emotion by another or by the appraisal of that 
emotion – may in many cases be the restraint we feel when two emotions are in 
conflict with one another or when we are conscious about the way our 
expressions and actions might affect another person. If I want to comfort a friend 
who is deeply distressed I may restrain my expressions of sympathy in case this 
upsets them even more, and instead adopt a posture of being quietly supportive. 
Here, the interactive and communicative relationship between us determines the 
way we affect and restrain one another: if my friend becomes less distressed, my 
emotional tone may become more assertively positive to support the change in 
mood. What is important, then, in this relational position is not so much the 
appraisal of the situation by a lone individual in terms of their own goals, but the 
interaction of two or more people in which their emotions are generated, 
restrained and toned by the relations between them; ones that will involve 
emotional responses that may be ambivalent or contradictory. The desire to 
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comfort my distressed friend may also be tempered by feelings of disgust at hints 
of self-pity or fear at the extent of their distress. 
However, an issue raised by this relational stance is the place of goals in the 
understanding of emotion. The theories of emotion regulation we have 
considered so far can be related to what Joas (1996) has identified as the 
utilitarian or instrumental model of action, in which action is conceived of a 
priori as individual and oriented towards clear goals. Emotion regulation theory 
is also related to a second model of action that Joas calls ‘normative,’ in which 
individuals strive to fit or adapt their actions to a social framework of values or 
rules. The power of emotion regulation theories comes from the fact that these 
explanations make sense to us, because from time to time we all act and feel in 
instrumental and normative ways. However, this is not the only way we act. As I 
pointed out in the example of the funeral above, not all of our feelings emerge 
from goal directed or normatively oriented actions. Instead, they emerge from 
deeper existential and relational connections to others and to aspects of our 
world. This would fit into Joas’s third model of action, derived from the 
pragmatist philosophy of thinkers like John Dewey and G. H. Mead, in which 
actions emerge from the web of communicative interactions individuals are 
engaged in. In this understanding, the basis of activity is embodied and habitual, 
but creativity occurs when problems are encountered in interactions and the 
participants must discursively reconstruct their actions through meaningful 
communication. Although Joas refers to this as creative action, I have argued that 
we can characterize it as aesthetic action, not in the sense of aesthetics as art 
theory but in terms of how humans make and experience meaning in embodied 
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interaction, and how emotion is generated as part of this (Burkitt, 2014). I will 
use this approach here to develop the relational understanding of emotions. 
 
Sociology and Social Psychology of Emotion 
There is a large body of literature on emotions in the social sciences, of which 
Turner and Stets (2005) have provided a thorough overview, including both 
‘macro-structural’ and ‘micro-structural’ approaches, while Barbalet (1998) has 
provided his own macro-sociological account. Kemper (2011) has tried to form a 
bridge between the macro-structures of society and the micro-interactions of 
everyday life in the study of emotions by focusing on the status-power 
dimensions of interrelations. However, this has focused his work on six basic 
emotions (anger, sadness, fear, joy, shame, and guilt) and limited the 
understanding of emotions in power relations solely to the reaction at gaining or 
losing power and status (Burkitt, 2005). In contrast, Hochschild (1983) is one of 
the most prominent exemplars in sociology of a normative approach to the 
management of emotion, showing how this is achieved according to the ‘feeling 
rules’ of various situations. Although she also adopts an interactionist approach, 
this is informed by the work of Goffman (1961) in which social actors reproduce 
familiar encounters and situations through the norms and rules that constitute 
social order. The idea of feelings being managed according to the ‘feeling rules’ 
or ‘display rules’ (Ekman, 1972) of local cultures is one that has been taken up by 
the emotion regulation literature, although the idea falls into the ‘two-step’ 
problem already criticized here, because it suggests that first an emotion arises 
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which then needs managing to bring it into line with cultural rules and 
expectations. For Hochschild (1979) the self is conceptualised as an ‘emotion 
manager’ that acts to shape emotion into something that is acceptable according 
to the rules of the situation. This is done through ‘emotion work’, involving ‘deep 
acting’, whereby the emotion-managing self produces the required emotion, 
either by evocation, ‘in which the cognitive focus is on a desired feeling which is 
initially absent’ but needs to be evoked, or by suppression ‘in which the cognitive 
focus is on an undesired feeling which is initially present’ and has to be hidden or 
expunged (Hochschild, 1979, p. 561). 
Following on from this, in social psychology the normative approach and the 
concept of feeling rules remain central to theories of emotion regulation. For 
example, Mesquita, De Leersnyder, and Albert (2014) show how the feeling rules 
of a culture designate the most desirable and valued emotional states and, as 
such, are endpoints of emotion regulation. Thus, emotions are regulated ‘in ways 
that improve their match with the prevalent cultural models of self and relating’ 
(Mesquita, De Leersnyder, and Albert, 2014, p. 287). This approach is interesting 
from my point of view for two reasons; first, because it claims that emotions are 
relationship engagements and that emotion regulation refers to the processes 
that fashion emotions to be the most adaptive within relationships, according to 
cultural models. Second, they want to move beyond the psychological focus on 
individual emotion regulation to what they call social emotion regulation in which 
the social and cultural environment is the agent of regulation. In this way they 
take Gross’s process model of emotion regulation and put it into a social context, 
showing how cultural models are central to situation selection, the focus of 
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attention, appraisal and reappraisal of situations, and behaviour regulation. So 
for example, cross-cultural research has shown that cultures tend to promote 
and support situations that generate culturally favoured emotions – such as 
shame and conformity in Japan, or anger and independence in the US – and avoid 
situations arising that would elicit less favoured or condemned emotions 
(Mesquita et al., 2014). 
Although this approach has similarities to the model I am developing here, there 
are some differences with it. The functional model they use tends to focus on the 
mechanisms that ‘align an individual’s emotional experience to the pertinent 
cultural model’ (Mesquita et al., 2014, p. 297), but again we lose the importance 
of emotional ambivalence and conflict in which individuals may struggle to align 
their emotions to the required cultural models or may resist doing so. It also 
assumes that there is just one appropriate cultural model that people have to 
deal with, and that there is no clash or contradiction between different norms in 
situations. The relational approach to emotion also disappears somewhat in the 
functional approach, one that would help to better explain emotional 
ambivalence and conflict within cultural rules. 
 
The Relational and Interactive Generation and Restraint of Emotion 
Thus, in my view, we need to shift the focus away from regulation and instead 
see the generation and restraint of emotion as part of a relational and interactive 
process in which interrelated individuals affect and restrain one another within 
situations that have cultural meanings. It is not, then, primarily at the point of 
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regulation that emotions are culturally modulated; it is also at the point of 
generation where emotional experience emerges from embodied relations and 
interactions within culture. The exact emotions generated by these mutual 
affects depend on the relation between individuals within particular contexts of 
interaction (Burkitt, 2014). Emotion, then, is always ‘to or from or about 
something objective…[it is] implicated in a situation’ (Dewey, 1929/1958, p. 67). 
Furthermore, for Dewey, we do not just have a cognitive relation to the situation 
in which emotions are generated by evaluation, we are embodied in the situation 
and our bodily responses contain the evaluation itself, or at least its beginnings. 
When we step into the road, our fear of the car we did not see but is now upon us 
is not, in that instant, a cognitive appraisal of an abstract situation: it is fear of 
the oncoming car about to hit us. Thus valuing a situation is not so much a 
psychological act of perception or cognition, but of the embodied response, 
action, or habit in the situation, which contains the appraisal itself (Dewey, 
1894/1971). As Parkinson  (2007) has pointed out, emotion can emerge from a 
person’s orientation to a situation and from direct adjustments to relational 
dynamics going on within it – the appearance of a gunman in a bank would be 
directly perceived as scary. Thus, ‘emotions may start out not as sequential 
responses to information, but as ongoing adjustments attuned to unfolding 
transactions within the practical and social world’  (Parkinson, 2007, p. 24). 
This view chimes precisely with the relational and interactive approach that can 
be drawn from thinkers like Dewey above, and from Mead (1934) and Cooley 
(1922/1983). Here, emotion is generated from within emotional 
communications, where I respond to the attitudes that others take towards me 
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and, in turn, my response also affects others. These responses are not 
naturalistic but come from our socialization within a culture, which provides the 
background of social meaning through which we interpret the signs of emotion 
in another’s body – in their looks, gestures, body posture, tone of voice, etc. The 
attitudes communicated by others affect my own view of myself, what Cooley 
called the ‘my-feeling’, so that if others respond to something I have done in a 
disapproving way this impacts my feelings about myself – am I really such a bad 
person? This can contradict with the view and the feelings others have of me, or 
that I have developed about myself through my social interactions in the past, so 
that we can form ambivalent feelings about our selves and our actions. Indeed, 
for these interactionists, consciousness is an internal conversation or dialogue 
between different voices, or between different standpoints on our self or 
situation, which also involves what Mead called a ‘dialogue of impulses’: that is, a 
range of different feelings, emotions or motives in a situation, and it is the role of 
consciousness to debate and decide upon these. However, these inner 
conversations are not purely individual because they are linked to the wider 
social dialogue – the communication of attitudes and evaluations – that is 
reflected and refracted within them. Evaluation, appraisal, and reappraisal are 
therefore not only related to individual goals and beliefs, but also to collective 
cultural values around which relations and interactions between individuals and 
groups are centred. As individuals and groups collectively debate and re-
evaluate these beliefs from various conflicting positions they become open to 
change, so that reappraisal is not solely an individual, cognitive process, but one 
that happens interactively across space and time. 
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In this view, consciousness is not understood along the lines of an information-
processing model, one centred on the cognition of an individual or their own 
personal meanings. Indeed, situations are rarely straightforward and are often 
contradictory or ambiguous. Because they are not transparent, information 
cannot be extracted from situations solely through the direction of attention or 
by appraisals that cognitively assess events through the goals, needs and beliefs 
of an individual. Instead, situations can be ambiguous and thinking is 
interpretative in terms of the social meaning of the context or of its conflicting 
meanings. Nor is the self understood as an emotion manager in this interactive 
approach: rather, consciousness is an inner dialogue between different, 
ambivalent impulses, feelings, and emotions, and also a dialogue between 
different standpoints involving the attitude that others have taken, or might take, 
towards us. How we act depends on the outcome of these dialogues, with the self 
being composed of varied, often contradictory feelings and viewpoints. Here, 
feeling rules are not the central order of concern: the normative standards of a 
culture are part of the wider set of cultural meanings through which we interpret 
situations and the behaviour and attitudes of others within them. It is from these 
standpoints that we reflect on situations and upon our own feelings and 
impulses, choosing the actions we feel are appropriate in context or that we feel 
will affect others in the desired way. 
This means that emotion regulation itself can be reframed in a relational, 
interactive, and bodily perspective as opposed to a purely cognitive one (Szanto 
& Krueger, 2015). For example, Varga and Krueger (2013) have talked about 
distributed emotion regulation, which is a process that occurs in the interaction 
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between people. They have studied this in relation to depressive states and to 
child development, in the latter case where both emotion generation and 
regulation takes place in the relation between child and caregiver. In this close 
relationship the infant does not simply learn from the caregiver but rather 
experiences the world through them, assimilating their bodily stance and the 
vitality of the bodily interactions between them, through which the infant comes 
to relate to the world from their own position. So young infants rely heavily on 
the intervention of caregivers to regulate their emotions for them and caregivers 
do so through physical interactions – such as directing a child’s attention, 
touching and holding them, using mutual gestures and vocalisations. These 
interactions direct an infant’s attention away from distressing things and 
towards more positive experiences, help to construct their activities and to 
stimulate them, but also to comfort and sooth. In doing this, caregivers provide a 
distributed relational stimulation and regulation of the infant’s arousal levels and 
background emotions. Furthermore, different patterns of interaction create 
different relationship-specific ‘affective contours’ or vitality affects (Stern, 1985) 
that become manifest as particular emotions. This creates a sense of ‘feeling 
connectedness’ to the world that, if lacking, can lead to a range of problems in 
adulthood, such as depression and other negative background emotions. 
Thus, Varga and Krueger show how emotion regulation itself depends on the 
way we take the standpoint of others into our own self and experience the world 
through them, even though at this stage it happens through vitality affects rather 
than by taking the point of view of another through dialogue. It could be claimed 
that this is another example of extrinsic emotion regulation, focused on infants 
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rather than the intrinsic regulation in adults. However, for Varga and Krueger 
these early relations with others – and through them, with the world – can 
endure into adulthood as embodied emotional dispositions, such as depression. 
Furthermore, in their approach, relationships are the ontological starting point 
because people do not simply act to suppress or change another’s emotional 
responses: instead, the interaction between people affects their very being, 
forming the self and its emotional dispositions in the world and its ways of being 
with others. Emotions and feelings, then, are generated and regulated in 
situations where we are engaged in embodied interactions and, as such, they are 
about our being in the world and being in relation to others. 
 
Conclusion 
I have been arguing here that we need to decentre the concept of emotion 
regulation in order to shift attention away from a primary focus on regulation or 
management, instead understanding the restraint of emotion as occurring in the 
relations between people that also involve the ways individuals affect one 
another and so generate emotion. From a psychological perspective, Gross’s 
theory of emotion regulation has advanced our understanding of both generation 
and regulation processes, specifically in circumstances where individuals act 
instrumentally, experiencing emotion in pursuit of individual goals or personal 
meanings, and attempting to manage emotions normatively in accordance with 
cultural regulations. It is not so much, then, that this approach is wrong; indeed it 
explains those experiences we all have from time to time when we struggle with 
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difficult or unwanted emotions that interfere with our everyday functioning. 
However, the approach is limited by its very instrumental and individualistic 
ontology and by the centrality it gives to a two-step emotion regulation process. 
In contrast, Campos et al. (2004) suggest a relational approach to emotion and 
its regulation that places humans into the larger but concentric circles of social 
relations, from small group situations to the cultural and historical: however, 
they too are limited by their adherence to an individualistic, goal-oriented 
understanding of emotion. By expanding on individualistic and disembodied 
cognitive approaches through an interdisciplinary perspective drawing on the 
social sciences, we can begin to see how the process of emotion regulation can be 
set firmly in a social and cultural context as social emotion regulation or as 
distributed emotion regulation. However, by adopting a relational and social 
interactionist approach, we can also understand how the embodied emotions 
experienced in different situations can be contradictory and ambivalent, and that 
there are not just two steps in emotion regulation but at times just one; when 
two contradictory feelings or emotions are present and we need to resolve this 
tension. And such a resolution is rarely achieved alone: we regularly talk our 
emotional dilemmas through with those closest to us, meaning that the 
reappraisal of emotion is not always a lone, cognitive task. Indeed, consciousness 
itself is a dialogical phenomenon, so that even if we attempt to resolve dilemmas 
ourselves, we do so by debating from various standpoints and from the 
viewpoints of others with whom we are related. In this approach, consciousness 
is not about processing information but about the interpretation of meaning as 
we move through the situations that compose our lives, all the while being 
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emotionally affected, moved, and restrained by the actions of others, just as they 
are emotionally affected and restrained by us. Emotion generation and 
regulation occurs in patterns of relations involving embodied dialogical selves in 
a social and cultural world. 
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